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THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION'S
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL,
FREE TRADE AND THE AMERICAN EXAMPLE
by Alicia M. Bartkowski*

INTRODUCTION
Public health has emerged as one of the most important issues of our
global age.' According to estimates, some three million deaths are attributable to
smoking annually, and that number may rise to ten million within 30 or 40
years. The World Health Organization (WHO) is in the process of developing
an international framework convention for tobacco control in order to work
towards the "adoption of comprehensive tobacco policies" and methods to cope
"with aspects of tobacco control that transcend national boundaries."3 At the
same time, however, seven metric tons of tobacco are produced per year.4 This
makes tobacco the world's most grown non-food crop, grown in more than 100
countries across six continents.5 Many developing countries also account for
about 80% of the world's production of tobacco, counting on the crop as a major
source of foreign income. 6 Currently, no states favor a world government that
would dictate uniform behavior for all.7 Competing interests of health and
finance must be balanced in a way addressing issues of the health epidemic
posed by tobacco consumption against the possibility of significantly altering

* Ms. Bartkowski is a student at the Hofstra University School of Law.

'David P. Fidler, Public Healthand InternationalLaw: Introductionto Written Symposium on
PublicHealth and InternationalLaw, 3 CH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2002).
2 R Peto et al. Mortalityfrom smoking worldwide, 52 BRIT. MED. BULL. 12-21 (1996), available at
http://bmb.oupjournals.org/cgi/gca?SEARCHID=- 1048974446101_ 19&AUTHOR1=Peto%2BR%/62
B&TITLEABSTRACT=Mortality+from+smoking+worldwide&JOURNALCODE=&FIRSTNDEX
=O&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&gca=52%2F 1%2F12&sendit=Get+AII+Checked+Abstract%/o28s

%29.

3 David

Malcolm, Tobacco, Global PublicHealth,and Non-Governmental Organizations:An
Eminent Pandemic orJust Another Legal Product?28 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 43 (1999).
4 International Tobacco Growers Association, Issues: World TobaccoleafData,
at
http://www.tobaccoleaf.org/issues/worldprod.htm (last visited March 29, 2003).
5International Tobacco Growers Association, Issues: The Economicand Social Value of Tobacco In
Grower Countries, at http://www.tobaccoleaf.org/ (last visited March 29, 2003).
61d.
7Jonathan I. Chamey, Universal InternationalLaw, 87 AM.J.INT'L.L. 529, 530 (1993).
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production and profitability.8 Many nations, including the United States, 9 are
interested in what may come of such an agreement. In the United States, public
attitude toward smoking began to shift in the 1990s,10 and much tobacco
litigation occurred which may provide the structure for the possible claims that
may arise under an international framework convention on tobacco control.
However, the World Health Organization has no judicial body of its own, so
consideration must also be given as to where such claims will be taken if a
dispute were to arise."
The focus of this note will be based on these areas. Part I reviews the
general structure and powers of the World Health Organization. Part II provides
an in-depth look at the proposed Framework Convention for Tobacco Control,
including areas of proposed protocols: tax measures, regulation of contents,
packaging and labeling, advertising, promotion and sponsorship and smuggling.
Part III discusses the implications of the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control on the concept of Free Trade. Part IV examines the competing interests
that the World Heath Organization will need to be aware of when developing the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, including the effects on various
nations in the world. Part V discusses tobacco litigation in the United States,
which may serve as a potential model for the claims that may arise in connection
with the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Finally, Part VI focuses
on potential arenas in which disputes of the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control may be brought if agreement cannot be reached between the parties.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
The World Health Organization (WHO) was created in 1948 and is
responsible for monitoring world health and working towards "the attainment by
all peoples of the highest possible level of health."' 2 As the United Nations
agency chosen to coordinate international health work, the WHO has the
responsibility of achieving health goals of the UN Charter. 13 Countries, which
are members of the United Nations, may become members of the WHO by
accepting its Constitution.' 4 In addition, other countries may be admitted as
8Crystal Williamson, Comment,

Clearingthe Smoke: Addressing the Tobacco Issue as an
InternationalBody, 20 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 587, 594 (2002).
9 See DR. JUDITH MACKAY & DR. MICHAEL ERIKSEN, THE TOBACCO ATLAS 53 (Myriad Editions

Limited, 2002), available at http://www5.who.int/tobacco/page.cfm?sid=84 Tobacco Trade table,
stating that the United States is the world's largest exporter of cigarettes.
10Malcolm, supranote 3 at 7.
1 Alyssa Woo, Note, Health Versus Trade: The Future of the WHO's Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1731, 1747-48 (2002).
12Constitution of the World Health Organization, art.l, para. 1. (The WHO Constitution was signed

on 22 July 1946 and went into effect on 7 April 1948).
13Allyn L.Taylor, An InternationalRegulatory Strategyfor GlobalTobacco Control, 21 YALE J.
INT'L L. 257, 279 (1996).
14World Health Organization, Countries,at http://www.who.int/country/en/ (last visited March 29,
2003).
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members when their application has been approved by a simple majority vote of
the World Health Assembly.' 5 The Members or other authorities may also admit
territories not responsible for the conduct of their international relations as
Associate Members upon application made on their behalf responsible for their
international relations.' 6 Members of the WHO are grouped according to
regional distribution.' 7 Currently, the WHO consists of 192 Member States,
including 46 countries in Africa, 35 countries in the Americas, 22 countries in
the Eastern Mediterranean, 51 countries in Europe, 11 counties in South-East
Asia and 27 countries of the Western Pacific.' 8 The WHO performs its
functions through three principal bodies: World Health Assembly (WHA), the
Executive Board and the Secretariat. 19
The World Health Assembly (WHA) is the supreme decision-making
body for the WHO, it meets in Geneva in May each year, and is attended by
delegations from all 192 Member States. 20 Its main function is to determine the
policies of the Organization. 2' Article 19 of the World Health Organization's
Constitution states, "the Health Assembly shall have the authority to adopt
conventions or agreements with respect to any matter within the competence of
the Organization. 22 Under Article 21, the WHO grants the WHA the power to
make regulations in five areas: (1) sanitary and quarantine regulations; (2)
nomenclatures on diseases, causes of death, and public health practices; (3)
standards for diagnostic procedures for international use; (4) standards for the
safety, purity, and potency of biological, pharmaceutical, and similar products
moving in international commerce.23
The Health Assembly appoints the Director-General, supervises the
financial policies of the Organization, and reviews and approves the proposed
program budget.24 It also considers reports of the Executive Board, instructing in
regard to matters, which further action, study, investigation or report may be
required. 25 The Executive Board is composed of thirty-two members technically26
qualified in the field of health, and members are elected for three-year terms.
The main Board meeting, at which the agenda for the Health Assembly is agreed
upon and resolutions for forwarding to the Health Assembly are adopted, is held
in January, and another meeting is held in May, immediately after the meeting
151d.
161id
7

' 1d.

t8 World Health Organization, Member States, at
http://www3.who.int/whosis/member-states/member-states.cfm?path=whosis,member-statesmemb
erstateslist&language=english (last visited March 29, 2003).
'9 Brian McCarthy, Article and Essay, The World Health Organizationand Infectious Disease
Control:Challenges in the Next Century. 4 DEPAUL INT'L L.J. 115, 122 (2000).
0World Health Organization, Governance, at http://www.who.int/govemance/en/ (last visited
March 29, 2003).
21id.
2 Constitution of the World Health Organization, art. 19 para. 1.
2 Id.
24World Health Organization, supranote 20.
25
id.
2 id.
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of the Health Assembly, for more administrative matters.27 The main functions
of the Board are to give effect to the decisions and policies of the Health
Assembly, to advise it and to facilitate its work.28
Some 3500 health and other experts and support staff on fixed-term
appointments staff the Secretariat of the WHO, working at headquarters, in the
six regional offices, and in countries. 29 The six regional offices are located in
Africa, 3the
Eastern Mediterranean, Europe, South-East Asia and the Western
0
Pacific.
The Organization is headed by the Director-General, who is appointed
by the Health Assembly on the nomination of the Executive Board. 31 The
current Director-General is Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland.32
Under Articles 21 and 23 of the WHO Constitution, the Health
Assembly has authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to
any matter within the competence of the Organization.33 These regulations come
into force for all Members, after due notice has been given of their adoption by
the Health Assembly.34 However, under Article 22 of the WHO Constitution,
Members may notify the Director-General of rejection or reservation within the
period stated in the notice to the items adopted under Article 21, thereby opting
out of them.3 5 Adopted resolutions are soft law, intended to have binding effects
creating obligations and rights, even though there may be this possibility37 opting
36
OUt. Despite this authority, the WHO rarely uses its legislative powers.
However, this changed in 1996. In Resolution 17 of the 49th World
Health Assembly, member states recognized the unique capacity of the WHO to
serve as a platform for the adoption of a Convention dealing with tobacco
control and began working toward this measure.38
Resolution WHA52.18 established an intergovernmental negotiating
body for the convention, which is open to all member states. 39 The negotiating
body's role is to draft and negotiate the proposed WHO framework,40 for the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and possible protocols. The
27

Id.

2 Id.
29 Id.
'0World Heath Organization, supranote 18.
31Id.
32

Id.

31See Constitution of the World Health Organization, arts. 21-23.
34William Onzivu, Public Health and the Tobacco Problem: InternationalLegal Implicationsfor
Africa, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 223, 250 (2001).
35Michelle Forrest, Using the Power of the World Health Organization:The InternationalHealth

Regulations and the Future of InternationalHealth Law, 33 COLUM. J.L.& SOC. PROBS. 153, 162

(2000).
m6Id.

37Woo, supra note 11 at 1737.
38WHA Res. 49.17, WHA, 49' Sess., 6" plen. mtg. 2 (1996), available at

http://tobacco.who.int/page.cfi?tld=37.
'9 WHA Res. 52.18, WHA, 52" Sess., 9"' plen. mtg. WHA Doc. A52/7 (1999), available at
http://tobacco.who.int/page.cfm?tld=134.
4 Id.
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Resolution further established a working group on the Convention open to all
member states in order to prepare the work of the intergovernmental negotiating
body.4'
Resolution WHA 53.16 stated that the proposed draft elements for a
framework convention established a sound basis for initiating the negotiations
by the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body.42 The Negotiating Body was also
called upon to commence its negotiations with an initial focus on the draft
framework convention, without prejudice to future discussions on possible
related protocols, and to examine the question of an extended participation as
observers of nongovernmental organizations according to the criteria to be
established by the body. a3
The most recent resolution WHA54.18, called for member states to be
aware of affiliations between the tobacco industry and member delegations."
Further, the WHO and Member States should be alert to any efforts by the
tobacco industry to continue its subversive practice and to assure the integrity of
health policy development in any WHO meeting and in national governments.45
Therefore, for the first time in history, the World Health Organization
has proposed to create the world's first set of multilateral negotiated rules
devoted entirely to a public health issue. The WHO will develop a Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), with the intention of combating the
tobacco epidemic.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) approach will
allow Member States to proceed in two stages: (1) The Framework Convention
will establish the legal parameters and structures of the public health tool and (2)
the Protocols will be separate agreements that will make up the substantive part
of the agreement.46 The WHO intends to have the FCTC ready for signature no
later than May of 2003. Suggested Protocols may include such specific
obligations
as:
pricing,
smuggling,
tax-free
tobacco
products,
advertising/sponsorships, internet advertising/trade, testing methods, package
design/labeling, information sharing, and agricultural diversification.
According to the Preamble of the most recent draft of the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, "the spread of the tobacco epidemic is a global
problem that calls for the widest possible international cooperation and the
41id.
42

WHA Res. 53.16, WHA, 53' Sess., 8"' plen. mtg. 4, WHA Doe. A53/VR/8 (2000), availableat

http://tobacco.who.int/page.cfin?tld=54.
43 id.
h
" WHA Res. 54.18, WHA, 54' Sess., 9"
plen. mtg. 3 (2001), availableat
http://tobacco.who.int/page.cfm?tld=l 12.
41Id. at

1.

46Allyn L. Taylor & Douglas W. Bettcher, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: a

global "good"forpublic health, 78 BULL. WHO 920, 920 (2000), available at
http://www.who.int/bulletin/pdf/2000/issue7/bu063 l.pdf.
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participation of all countries in an effective, appropriate and coordinated
international response."" 7 In early documents, the WHO stated its intention to
follow a step-by-step implementation of the FCTC, "[member] states will adopt
a framework convention that calls for cooperation in achieving broadly stated
goals, leaving open the possibility that the parties to the convention will
subsequently conclude separate protocols containing specific measures designed
to implement those goals." 48 Since the introduction of the FCTC, a Working
Group and an Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) began drafting what
will ultimately become the FCTC. 49 While the actual provisions of the FCTC
projected to be released in May 2003 may differ from that of the most current
draft released on June 25, 2002, it is most likely that the basic principles of this
discussion will remain the same.
The WHO quotes the preamble to its Constitution stating that "the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health [as] one of the
fundamental rights of every human being" as a source for creation of the
FCTC.50 Article 3 of the Drafting Convention states that the objective of the
FCTC and "its related protocols is to protect present and future generations from
devastating health, social, environmental and economic consequences of tobacco
consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke by providing a framework... 51
The latest proposed Draft of the FCTC lays out the organs essential to its
function. These include: a Conference of the Parties as an implementation
mechanism; 52 a Secretariat; 53 a scientific subsidiary 54 and a dispute settlement
body."
Under Article 5 of the proposed draft, each Party is obligated to pass
domestic legislation and make public policy according to the terms of the FCTC
and to the protocols to which it is a Party. 56 The remaining parts of the draft
deal with measures relating to the reduction of demand for tobacco, reduction of
the supply of tobacco, protection of the environment, liability and compensation,
and scientific and technical cooperation and communication of information. 7
Each State will take on a general obligation to adopt measures "to the extent
possible within the means at its disposal and its capabilities. 5 8
47Intergovernmental Negotiating Body on the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control,

6' Sess., Agenda Item 4, at 1, WHO Doc. A/FCTC/INB6/5 (2003), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/inb6/einb65.pdf
[hereinafter FCTC Text].
48Luk Joossens, Improving PublicHealth Through an InternationalFramework Convention on
Tobacco Control, FrameworkConvention on Tobacco Control, at 15, WHO Doc.
WHO/NCD/TFI/99.2 (1999), available at
http://www5.who.int/tobacco/repository/stp4 I/FCTC2.pdf.
49 WHA Res 52.18, supra note 39.
5 Id.
s' FCTC Text supranote 47 at 4.
2
ld. at 15-16.
5 Id. at 16-17.
4
' Id. at 13-14.
" Id. at 18.
'6

Id. at 5-6.
4-15.

57See id. at

IId. at5.
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There are five types of tobacco control measures that may generate disputes
if a signatory state enacts them under the FCTC voluntarily or by obligation
under a follow-up protocol:5 9 (i) pricing and tax measures under Article 6;60 (ii)
regulations on the contents of tobacco products under Article 9;61 (iii)
regulations on the packaging and labeling of tobacco products under Article 11
and Article 12;62 (iv) regulations on advertising, promotion, and sponsorship
under Article 13 ;63 and (v) measures to deter smuggling under Article 15.64
Although States are not required under the Draft to enact domestic obligation or
regulations for the majority of Articles, a footnote to Article 15 states that
negotiation of such a protocol by the INB at any point before the adoption of the
FCTC.65 Therefore, many areas of possible dispute may exist.
Tax Measures
Taxation has often been considered one of the most effective means of
reducing consumption.66 According to proponents of the proposed FCTC, the
international harmonization of taxes on tobacco products is necessary to avoid
excessive price differences among neighboring countries.67
Article 6 of the proposed Draft calls for the States to progressively restrict,
"with a view to prohibiting, duty free sales of tobacco products," as well as
"implementing tax polices and, where applicable, price policies, on tobacco
products so as to achieve a progressive reduction in tobacco consumption. 6 8
Although a free trade regime allows for taxes as long as there is no finding of
discrimination between like products on the basis of origin under the doctrines
of most favored nation status and national treatment, discrimination is possible
under Article XX(b) between domestic and imported tobacco products that
could be perceived as "arbitrary or unjustified" or as a disguised barrier to
trade. 69 Furthermore, a protocol in this area could call for mandatory
elimination of tax free and duty free sales, clearly limiting the free trade of such
products. 70
59Joseph

N. Eckhardt, Note, Balancing Interests in Free Trade and Health: How the WHO'S
Framework Convention on Tobacco ControlCan Withstand WTO Scrutiny, 12 DuKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 197, 221 (2002).
60 FCTC Text, supranote 47, at 6.
61Id.at 7.
62/d at 7-8.
63 Id. at

8-9.

6Id.at 10-11.
6 See Id. at 10. Footnote 1 of Article 15 provides, "there has been considerable discussion
throughout the pre-negotiation and negotiation FCTC process concerning the adoption of an early
protocol on illicit trade. The negotiation of such a protocol could be initiated by the INB before the
FCTC is adopted, by the INB following the adopting ofthe FCTC, or at a later stage by the
Conference of Parties."
66Luk Joossens, From Public Health to InternationalLaw: possible protocolsfor inclusion in the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,78 BULL. WHO 930, 931 (2000), available at
http://www.who.int/bulletin/pdf/2000/issue7/bu0567.pdf.
67 id.

6'FCTC Text supra note 47 at 6.
69Eckhardt, supranote 59 at 223.
70 Id.
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Regulation of Contents
Article 9 called for each Party to adopt and implement standards for
"regulation of the content of tobacco products, including standards and best
practices for testing and measuring... the content and emissions of such
products.' Once again, adoption of such a protocol may lead to discrimination
as with the taxing measures. Therefore, a challenging WTO member may argue
that the standard is "arbitrary and unjustified" given
72 the arbitrary nature of the
setting limits on the nicotine content of cigarettes.
Packaging and Labeling
73
Article 11 calls for adoption of requirements for packaging and labeling.
During its case, the Thailand Cigarette panel declared:
"Other countries [have] introduced strict, non-discriminatory labeling
[sic] and ingredient disclosure regulations which [allow] governments to
control, and the public be informed of, the content of cigarettes. A nondiscriminatory regulation implemented on a national treatment basis in
accordance with Article 111:4 requiring complete disclosure of ingredients,
coupled with a ban on unhealthy substances, would be an alternative
consistent with the General Agreement." 74
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of the World
Trade Organization ensures that technical regulations and standards such as
packaging labeling, and marketing provides for the use of labels on products
such as tobacco. 75 The TBT agreement will therefore apply in the case of
disputes regarding these measures, as it would with measures regarding
regulation of contents of tobacco products, since under Annex 1 of this
agreement, packaging and labeling regulations are defined as "technical
regulations." 76 Therefore, labeling requirements need be non-discriminatory in
nature in order to meet terms of free trade law.
Advertising, Promotion, and Sponsorship
Proponents of the FCTC feel that a total ban on advertising and sponsorship
is essential in order to reduce tobacco consumption significantly and quickly.77
Further, a ban on advertising and sponsorship should: (1) prohibit direct and
71FCTC Text, supranote 47 at 7.
72 Eckhardt,

supranote 59 at 224.

73FCTC Text, supranote 47 at 7.
74Thailand Restriction on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT

B.I.S.D. (37" Supp.) at 224 (1991), [hereinafter GAT-r Thailand Cigarettes Report].
75Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instruments Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1, art.
1.3 and 2.1 (1994), [hereinafter TBT], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop/tbt-e/tbtagre.htm.
76
Id. at art. 2.4.
77Joossens, supranote 66 at 933.
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indirect advertising; (2) include all media (such as radio, television, press,
cinema advertising, the Internet, etc); (3) include bans on the sponsorship of
national and international events; (4) cover the whole world, not be introduced
progressively
taking into account national level restrictions on tobacco
78
advertising.
Article 13 may be an attempt to commit States to phase out commercial
marketing of tobacco products. 79 This may be based upon the fact that the World
Bank reports that comprehensive bans on advertising of tobacco products could
reduce tobacco consumption in high income countries by more than six
percent. 80 However, the ThailandCigarettes case noted possible problems with
such a comprehensive ban:
A ban on advertisement of cigarettes of both domestic and foreign origin
would normally meet the requirements of Article 111:4. It might be argued
that such a general ban on all cigarette advertising would create unequal
competitive opportunities between the existing Thai supplier of cigarettes
and new, foreign suppliers and was therefore contrary to Article 111:4. Even
if this argument were accepted, such an inconsistency would have to be
regarded as unavoidable and therefore necessary within the meaning of
Article XX(b) because additional advertising rights would risk stimulating
demand for cigarettes. 8'

Further, principles of free expression, which are constitutionally protected
in many countries, may pose problems for advertising bans, even if such bans
are consistent with trade law.82 The Canadian Supreme Court overtumed a
general ban on tobacco advertising in 199583, and in October of 2000, the
European Court of Justice also overturned a similar ban.84 In the United States,
the Supreme Court upheld certain restrictions on sales of tobacco enacted in the
state of Massachusetts, but found that Massachusetts ban on outdoor tobacco
advertising,
such as billboards, violated First Amendment freedom of expression
85
rights.
Smuggling
According to an international report on tobacco trade, the smuggling of
cigarettes grew by about 73% worldwide between 1990 and 1995.86 By looking
78id.
79

FCTC Text supranote 47 at 9-10.
80The World Bank, Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of Tobacco Control 50
(1999) availableat http://wwwl.worldbank.org/tobacco/book/html/chapter4.htm.
81GATT Thailand Cigarettes Report, supra note 74 at 224.
8 Eckhardt, supra note 59 at 227.
8 RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Can., [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
8 Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2000
E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS 1846 (2000), availableat
http://www.sportslawnews.com/archive/Court/2ORulings/GermanyvEuropeanParliament.htm.
85Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
86Joossens, supranote 66 at 931.
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at the difference between global exports and 87imports, it has been argued that
most of the "missing" cigarettes are smuggled.
Article 15 of the Draft Convention states that essential components of
tobacco control include the elimination of all forms of illicit trade in tobacco
products, including smuggling.88
This seems to be the most stringent
requirement of the proposed Draft Convention. Section 2 of the agreement
provides, "the Parties agree that measures to this end shall be transparent, welldefined, non-discriminatory and implemented in accordance with their national,
regional and international obligations." 89 Section 3 states, "each party shall
adopt and implement effective legislation, executive, administrative or other
measures to ensure that all unit packet and outside packaging..." 90 Section 5
further imposes additional mandatory obligations on Parties to enact or
strengthen criminal penalties for trafficking of smuggled tobacco products and
to ensure that all contraband products are destroyed. 91 While this may seem
permissible, some critics contend that this area of regulation is one of trade more
than public health. 92

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO
CONTROL ON FREE TRADE
According to the theory of comparative advantage, the gains from trade
follow from allowing an economy to specialize where no governmental barriers
exist to trade. Under this theory, efficient producers in each region are free to
grow and expand production, capitalizing on their comparative advantage in the
market, causing inefficient producers to drop out. 93 Much of international
economic law has been based on the theory of competitive advantage, including
the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was developed in response to the
cold war.94 In its implementation, the WTO uses the rules developed in the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), 95 as well %as Supplementary
Agreements strengthened by its dispute settlement procedure.
While the majority of the GATT provisions are aimed at forbidding
protectionism and trade-restrictive measures, exceptions exist allowing for the
development and implementation of legitimate, but trade-restrictive, measures.97
8 id.
88FCTC Text supranote 47 at 11-12.

89id.
90

Id.

91Id.

92id.
9' Eckhardt, supra note 59 at 200.
94Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr.
15, 1994, Legal Instruments - Result of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
95General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-i1, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
9 Eckhardt, supra note 59 at 200.
97Id. at 202.
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One such exception has become known as the Article XX (b) exception, which
states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
(b) necessary to protect human,
contracting party of measures: ...
animal or plant life or health.98
Although the Article XX (b) exception has been employed in GATT
and WTO cases, many attempts using the exception to excuse trade restrictive
measures when aimed at protecting public health have failed. 99 One such case
was the case of the Thailand Cigarettes.
The government of Thailand passed the Tobacco Act in 1966,
forbidding tobacco imports without a license.100 The United States filed a
complaint with GATT,requesting the panel to find the restriction on cigarette
imports a violation of GATT Article XI: 1, arguing that the Article XX(b)
exception did not apply.' 0' Thailand argued, it implemented its policy as an
"objective of public health" and therefore qualified as an Article XX(b)
exception. 10 2 The panel sought advice from the WHO, and acknowledged that
"smoking constituted a serious risk to human health and that consequently,
measures designed to reduce the consumption of cigarettes fall within the scope
of Article XX(b).' 13 However, the panel noted that Article XX(b) requires that a
measure be "necessary," and that a measure to protect health could not be
considered "necessary" if a reasonable alternative that would not conflict will
free trade rules could be employed.' M The panel suggested that a general ban on
tobacco advertising by both foreign and domestic tobacco companies could be
an alternative means 10to5 curb consumption of cigarettes based on the evidence
offered by the WHO.
While health protection is an aspect of WTO law, the sovereign right to
restrict trade for public health reasons is subject to scientific and other
disciplines in order to ensure that health protection measures do not
unnecessarily restrict trade. 0 6 Therefore, arguments have been advanced for
further multilateral cooperation in the areas that have a bearing on international
trade such as the environment and health. 10 7 However, the WTO representative
98GATT, supranote 94 art. XX(b).

99Eckhardt, supranote 59 at 203.
1OO
GATT Thailand Cigarettes Report, supranote 74 at 200.
'o1
Id. at 201.
'02 Id.at 206.
103Id.at 73.
14 Idat 74.
0
' ' Id.at 78.
6 Onzivu, supranote 34 at 240.
107Id. at footnote 84. See Beef Hormones Case (United States and Canada v. European Union); see
also WTO Appellate Body Reports on Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WTO Doc.
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speaking at the Third Session of the Interagency Task Force identified two
principles of free trade that should be considered in order to evaluate health
protecting measures: non-discrimination and necessity. 08 It was explained that
the non-discrimination test should consider the principles of most favored nation
status and national treatment, while the necessity test "has to do with the extent
to which a measure that is taken by a country to achieve a certain objective is
truly necessary."' 9 The World Health Organization's proposed Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control may represent a multinational agreement that
infringes upon the rights of free trade.
OPPOSING STATE INTERESTS TO THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ON TOBACCO CONTROL
An international system of law "is formed when two or more states
have sufficient contact between them, and have a sufficient impact on one
another's decisions to cause them to behave- at least in some measure - as part
of a whole."" 0 An international society "exists when a group of states,
conscious of certain common interests and certain common values, form a
society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set
of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common
institutions.""' The States are the main source of the rules of international law,
of the international law reflects their common
and therefore the substance
12
interests and values.!
States, however, are sovereign, thus able to determine for themselves
what they must or may do. I13 The freedom of states to control their own
destinies and policies permits diversity and permits each state to chose its own
social priorities." 4 Few, if any, states favor a world government that would
dictate uniform behavior for all." 5 Therefore, any proposed rule intending to
impose international uniformity faces complications due to the interests each
nation has in its own sovereignty.
Many countries have raised constitutional concerns with other
international agreements dealing with trade. For example, debates over state

WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). This has been the position in several WTO position papers on the
subject of Trade and Environment.
"8 WTO Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(0 1)/DEC/W/1, art. 6 (Nov. 14, 2001), availableat
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0l_e/min01_14nove.htm.
1o9
Id.

11HEDLEY BULL,

THE ANARCHIcAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 9-10

(Columbia University Press 1977).
..Id.at 13.
112 David P. Fidler, International Law and Global Public Health, 48 KAN. L. REv. 1, 11 (1999).
113
Charney, supra note 7 at 530.
114
Id.

Id.

115
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sovereignty arose around the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1988.116 In
the United States, the problem was debated in Congress in consideration of the
WTO agreements and was then the focus of much debate during the negotiation
117
and ratification proceedings of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Other WTO member states, including Canada and European Community
countries, have raised constitutional issues as well. l l8 In the United States, the
principal arguments against constitutionality are based on Article III of the
Constitution, which vests the judicial power of the United States in the judiciary
established by Congress; the use of a congressional-executive agreement rather
than a treaty; the inadequacy of the due process guarantees; and "the sovereignty
argument.""19
Further, consideration must be given to the competing interests of
health and finances when discussing tobacco production and consumption. 120 On
one hand, a substantial risk of serious health problems arising out of the
consumption of tobacco products exists. 121 On the other hand, tobacco
production can become essential to the survival of a given economy. State
regulation can threaten the prosperity of the country by restricting productivity
and the financial success of the community.122 Therefore, states are faced with
the difficult task of balancing the interests of health and finance in a way that
addresses issues of the health epidemic posed by tobacco consumption
against
123
the possibility of significantly altering production and profitability.
The International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA) 24estimates
that over 100 million people are employed in tobacco-related industries, with 33
million people employed in the actual cultivation of tobacco. 125 The number of
people employed by the tobacco industry alone exceeds the
combined number of
126
people employed in the sugar cane and maize industries.

116
Yong K. Kim, Essay, The Beginning of the Rule of Law in the InternationalTrade System Despite
U.S. ConstitutionalConstraints,17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 967, 975-78 (1996). For the treaty, see Free
Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S. 27 ILM 281 (1988).
17 Eric Stein, InternationalIntegrationand Democracy: No Love at FirstSight, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L.
489, 503 (2001).
118Id. In the European Community, a constitutional issue arose over the division of treaty power
between the member states and the Community. In Japan, the approval of the WTO Agreement by
the Diet avoided a potential controversy over the authority of the executive to conclude treaties. In
Canada, the key constitutional issue was which level of government - federal or provincial - had the
authority to implement parts of the WTO Agreement.
119Id.
12oWilliamson, supra note 8 at 594.
121Id.

Id.
12 id.
124See the International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA) at http://www.tobaccoleaf.org, (last
122

visited March 29, 2003). The ITGA was established in 1984, as the worldwide voice of tobacco
farmers. The UK based organization founded by members from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Malawi,
the United States and Zimbabwe to promote and develop their common interests.
125ITGA, supranote 4.
mId
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Tobacco is grown in 100 countries around the world, and constitutes a
major cash crop in 80 developing countries. 12 7 Tobacco is the primary source of
income in many of these countries. For example, the Middle East and Asia
produce approximately 60% of the world's tobacco, up from 40% two decades
ago, while high-income countries like the United States reduced their total
production percentage. 128 Tobacco remains a highly attractive crop for
developing nations for the following reasons: prices are relatively stable
allowing farmers to obtain loans and plan ahead, the industry tends to be helpful
to tobacco farmers, tobacco is generally non-perishable thus eliminating storage,
collection and delivery problems,
and tobacco provides a higher income than
129
most cash and food crops.
The debate on the potential effect that such an agreement such as the
Framework Convention for Tobacco Control would have on economies
dependent upon tobacco is ongoing. The WHO states that the social and health
costs of tobacco far outweigh the economic benefits of tobacco cultivation.
However, four of the five countries that produce two-thirds of the world's
tobacco - Brazil, China, India, and Turkey 130 - may be forced to stop cultivating
tobacco through efforts financed on their own behalf.' 3 ' Brazil is the largest
exporter of tobacco leaf, exporting 343,000 metric tons in 1999 alone.' 32 In
1980, China exported practically no cigarettes, however, in 2001 their exports
33
had risen to over 20 billion cigarettes, worth about $320 million US dollars.1
Further, estimates state that by the year 2005,
the value of China's export trade
34
is predicted to be $600 million US dollars.1
Two developing countries, Zimbabwe and Kenya, depend greatly on
the tobacco market. The addition of tobacco to Kenya's existing production of
tea, coffee, and other products allowed the county to become more diverse in
their export base, as well as reduced the country's economic risk and provided
more opportunities for farmers. 35 In 2001, 4,500 hectares of Kenya's farmland
were devoted to growing tobacco, producing 7,000 metric tons. 1 36 Zimbabwe's
exportation has become essential to the government's ability to provide the basic
foodstuffs for its citizens. 37 After a significant population increase and droughts
that decreased the availability of homegrown food products, Zimbabwe was

The World Bank, supra note 80 at 58.

127

128
id.

Id.

129

Mackay, supra note 9 at 46. The United States is the fifth.

130

131FCTC Text, supra note 47 at 19-20.

Mackay, supra note 9 at 52.
Id.

132
133

Id.

134
135
136

The World Bank, supra note 80 at 58.
Food and Agriculture Organization, Tobacco Leaves, Area Harvested (Hectares),2001,

FAOSTATDatabase results, at http://apps.fao.org/lim500/nphwrap.pl?Production.Crops.Primary&Domain=SUA (last visited March 29, 2003).
117The World Bank, supra note 80 at 58.
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forced to begin importing products it had previously provided for itself, which
were paid for largely by funds from tobacco exportation. 3 '
Further, African governments face the dilemma of how to deal with a
product which is both a health hazard and an important economic commodity
that sits in a regulatory "no person's land."' 39 It is neither a drug nor a food
product for regulatory purposes and, thus remains a legal product. 140 Given this
conflict of interest between health and corporate wealth, public policy on
tobacco continues to be ad-hoc, with no meaningful legislation to control
tobacco in Africa. 141
42 South Africa seems to be the only area with strong tobacco
control regulation. 1
In regards to markets like that of Kenya and Zimbabwe, the preamble
to the proposed Draft Convention states that they must be "mindful of the social
and economic difficulties that tobacco control measures may engender... and
recognizing their need for access to the financial, economic and technological
resources required to achieve sustainable development and to decrease their
medium and long-term economic dependence upon tobacco."' 143 Supporters of
the proposal claim that international law provides the only means for possible
successful promotion of public health in areas such as Africa, where there is an
"absence of viable domestic legislation."' 144 However, the majority of the
proposed areas of regulation call for domestic regulation in furtherance of
promoting the Draft Convention. So Africa may still face problems promoting
public health even with the intervention of international law.
The United States has a major interest in what may come of the FCTC.
In the United States, tobacco sales overseas have increased dramatically, with
over $6 billion each year coming from such sales.145As much as 40% of tobacco
grown and manufactured in the United States is sold elsewhere, with major
purchasers including: Japan, Belgium, Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia, 146 making
the United States the world's largest exporter of cigarettes. 147
Tobacco companies in the United States exported 133.9 billion
cigarettes to its leading importers in 2001.48 In 1996, the United States exported
539 million pounds of leaf tobacco valued at US$ 1.39 billion. 49 U.S. Tobacco
Companies exported cigarettes to 121 different countries on six continents in

138
Id.
139Cass R. Sunstein, Regulations:Is Tobacco a Drug?Administrative Agencies as Common Law

Courts, 47 DuKE L. J. 1013, 1014 (1998).
140Id. at 1019.

141
Onzivu, supra note 34 at 242.
142Id

143
FCTC Text, supranote 47 at 2.
44
Onzivu, supranote 34 at 244.
14s
Joel Kirkland, Ban Sought on Tobacco Trade Help, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1997, 1 at 13.
146
The Economist. The Weed that Rules No Longer, Sept. 28, 1991 at 27.
147
Mackay, supranote 9 at 53.
148Foreign Agric. Serv., U.S. Dep't ofAgric., U.S. Exports to leadingdestinations2001-2002, at

http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefmg/Tobacco/Data/table08.pdf (last visited March 29, 2003).
149
Lucien J. Dhooge, Smoke Across Waters: Tobacco Productionand Exportationas International
Human Rights Violations, 22 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 355, 357 (1998).
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1997.150 Thirty percent of these exports were to Asia, with most sales occurring
in countries located in the Pacific Rim, specifically Japan, the Republic of
Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Malaysia.1 51 Other areas in which
exports were high include the former Soviet Union, especially in the Russian
and Ukrainian markets.15 2 With primary markets in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Israel, and Kuwait, U.S. exports to the Middle East were also
substantial. 53 In Europe, Belgium and Cyprus were leading importers of U.S.
cigarettes in 1997.154 In South America, Panama
and Paraguay were leading
55
importers of U.S. cigarettes that same year.1
The tobacco industry remains one of the top five industries in terms of
sales, assets, and profits in the United States. 156 The area of most concentration
is the South where the majority of tobacco farmers are located in six states:
1 57
North Carolina, Kentucky, South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia and Tennessee.
Tobacco farming is also made possible through insurance subsidies
from the federal government. 158 The crop insurance program helps lower
premiums for farmers of the country's major crops, including tobacco. 59 The
federal government acts as a safety net for private insurance companies that
write crop insurance policies.1 60 Through this insurance, tobacco farmers are
protected from bad harvests and weather-related disasters.1 61 There have been
several attempts to end federal
62 crop insurance for tobacco farmers that have
narrowly failed in Congress.
Six tobacco companies - R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; Liggett Group,
Inc.; American Brands; Lorillard Tobacco Co.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.; and Philip Morris USA - control the overwhelming majority of the

0Id. at 392.

151Id.
152Id. In 1997, U.S. exports to Russia totaled 10.2 billion cigarettes valued at US$ 232.6 million.

U.S. Tobacco Companies exported 3.41 billion cigarettes, valued at US$ 80.13 million, to the
Ukraine during this same period of time.
13 Id. In 1997, U.S. cigarette exports to Lebanon totaled 10.33 billion units valued at US$ 178.4
million. Cigarette exports to Saudi Arabia totaled 9.34 billion united, valued at $205.6 million.
Turkey imported 5.85 billion U.S. cigarettes valued at US$ 58.2 million in 1997. During this same
period of time, Israel imported 3.22 billion cigarettes valued at US$ 64 million. Finally in 1997,
Kuwaitt imported 1.89 billion cigarettes valued at US$ 42.43 million.
154Id In 1997, U.S. exports to Belgium totaled 48.52 billion units valued at US$ 1.02 billion. During
this same period of time, Cyprus imported 9.94 billion cigarettes from U.S. tobacco companies
valued at US$ 42.43 million.
155Id In 1997, Panama imported 2.41 billion cigarettes valued at US$ 44.53 million from U.S.
tobacco companies. U.S. cigarette exports to Paraguay totaled 2.23 billion units valued at US$ 43.32
million in 1997.
156Clara S. Ross, Comment, Judicialand Legislative Control of the Tobacco Industry: Toward a
Smoke-Free
Society? 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 317, 331(1987).
157
Id.

58

1

id.

159 Id

160oid.

161
Jeffery Taylor, Tobacco FarmersLobby for Slice of Settlement to Protect Them Against a Decline
in Demand,WALL ST. J., July 16, 1997, at A24.
162Id
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United States' cigarette market. 163 In addition, there are many industries that aid
in the manufacture of cigarettes, including storage, 6transportation,
banking,
4
chemical, paper, cellophane and lighter manufacturers.'
As the domestic growth leveled off and legal battles developed, the
tobacco companies began diversifying. 165 The tobacco companies began
acquiring related industries and eventually different industries. 166 Today,
although the companies are not exclusively tobacco companies,167the majority of
their profits continue to come from the sale of tobacco products.

TOBACCO LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES AS A BLUEPRINT
FOR THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL
In the 1990s, several important changes significantly affecting the
tobacco companies occurred in the United States. In litigation, plaintiffs began
to assert novel claims that the addictive qualities of nicotine relieve the plaintiff
from the burden of assuming risk.1 68 Plaintiffs are better financed than earlier
plaintiffs. 169 Previously unavailable industry information and documents have
come forth. 170 Furthermore, lawyers have discovered inexpensive but
moderately effective ways of trying cases.171
As if not more important, public
1 72
attitudes towards smoking began to shift.
While what happened in the United States may not provide a blueprint
for the World Health Organization, it will at least have broken the ground. The
suits may provide information as to what claims will have the greatest likelihood
of success. Further, the suits may help the WHO with structural developments in
establishing the FCTC. Therefore, the following section will provide an in-depth
analysis of the history of tobacco litigation in the United States.
Early Litigation
Prior to 1996, approximately 800 lawsuits had been filed against
tobacco companies. 173 Of those 800 lawsuits, only 24 went to trial. In each of
Ross, supranote 158 at 332.

163

164Id.

Id.

165

166id.
167Id. at

333.

Wendy E. Parment, Tobacco, HIV and the Courtroom:The role of affirmative litigation in the
formation
ofpublic health policy, 36 HOus. L. REV. 1663, 1675 (1999).
169id.
170 Arthur B. LaFrance, The ChangingFace of law and medicine in the new millennium: Tobacco
168

Litigation: Smoke, mirrors,andpublic policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 192 (2000).
171 Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and InjuriousIndustries,75
N.Y.U. L.
REV. 354, 361 (2000).
172 Malcolm, supra note 10 at 7.
173 Benjamin Weiser, Tobacco's Trials; Cigarette makers once were so hard to beat in court that
many top lawyers refused to take them on. Then a group of attorneys, mostly in small Southern
towns,found new ways past tobacco's defenses - and now, the industry is hinting about a deal,
WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1998, at WIS.
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those cases, the plaintiff's claims failed. 74 Early tobacco litigation consisted of
individual cases where the plaintiff sought compensation for injuries caused by
tobacco-related illnesses. 75 Tobacco companies were able to successfully
defend these cases by asserting that the plaintiffs chose to smoke and therefore
assumed the risk in spite of federally mandated warning labels. 76
Trial and appellate courts rulings often favored the defendants during
these early lawsuits, while juries tended to come out against them. 77 The
cigarette companies often used the assumption of the risk defense, and often
benefited from inconclusive medical studies, which failed to prove a causal link
between smoking and the plaintiffs' injuries. 178 The assumption of the risk
argument seemed to persuade the juries, even though some courts found that
sufficient medical evidence existed to prove a causal link. 179 Due to these early
victories, success of future lawsuits seemed unlikely, and this seems to be the
reason that
few lawsuits were filed against the tobacco companies during the
0
1970s.18
Changes
Changes began to develop leaving tobacco companies vulnerable to tort
liability. In 1972, the Surgeon General published a report on the health
consequences of smoking suggesting that not only could smokers face health
problems, but also nonsmokers were at risk from secondhand smoke. 81 Medical
studies became more conclusive, indicating that smoking is a human carcinogen,
18 2
in addition to causing numerous other serious diseases and afflictions.
Another change that occurred came in product liability law. 183 Nearly
every state has adopted strict liability in tort law either through common law or
by statute. '84 Strict liability holds manufacturers liable for defective products
they produce, regardless of negligence.185 The goals strict liability seek to
achieve include: compelling manufacturers to produce safer products and the
notion of fairness.' 86 Under strict products liability, the plaintiff is not required
to prove that the defendant was negligent or otherwise at fault for the harm
caused by the product. 187 Instead, the plaintiff must only show that the product
174Id.

175Douglas N. Jacobson, Note, After Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.: How Wide Will the Floodgates
of Cigarette LitigationOpen? 38 AM. U. L. REv.1021, 1030 (1989).
176Id.

177Id. at 1033-1034.
178Id.
79

at 1032.
' 0 d. at 1036.
181Matthew Baldini, The CigaretteBattle: Anti-Smoking Proponents Gofor the Knockout, 26
SETON
HALL
L. REV. 348, 349 (1995).
82
1 Id. at 354.
183Jacobson, supranote 175 at 1036.
184id.
185Ellen Wetheimer, Pandora'sHumidor: Tobacco ProducerLiability in Tort, 24 N. Ky. L. REV.
397, 400 (1997).
'86Id. at 400-408.
187Id at 414.
1 Id
81
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was somehow defective; that the product's defect somehow caused the injury or
harm to the plaintiff; and that the defendant sold the product to the plaintiff in its
defective or dangerous state.' 88
Even with these important changes, tobacco companies were still
winning the cases in the 1980s.18 9 The first major defeat for the tobacco
companies came in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.,19° where a jury found that
the Liggett Group had failed to properly warn consumers of the known health
risks associated with smoking, and that this failure to warn was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's death.' 9'
This marked the beginning of new approaches to tobacco litigation.
While scientific and medical evidence was weakening the tobacco companies'
defense that cigarettes were not harmful, their main argument that smoking is a
personal choice (a variation on assumption of the risk) still seemed to carry a lot
of weight with courts and juries. 92 The argument can be clearly stated as: a
person has the right to chose to smoke cigarettes, and people who choose to
smoke have no one to blame but themselves.' 93 Tobacco companies take this
argument one step further and state that holding the manufacturer liable for their
cigarettes interferes with a person's right to smoke. '94
The strength of this argument forced plaintiffs to find new ways to
attack tobacco companies. One such argument came after the Food and Drug
Administration announced they were investigating allegations that the tobacco
industry manipulated the level of nicotine in cigarettes. 95 While the tobacco
companies had warned consumers about the health risks associated with
smoking, they had not warned people about the risk of addiction. Not only were
no warnings of addiction given, but also the tobacco manufacturers were
allegedly manipulating
the nicotine content in cigarettes to get people addicted
196
to cigarettes.
This discovery, among others, began to surface around 1994, with the
disclosure of industry documents and deposition testimony of former industry
employees in private lawsuits against the industry. 19 7 This new information
shifted the focus of plaintiff suits away from liability issues stemming from the
health risks of smoking and towards issues of industry misconduct. 98

188

Jacobson, supra note 175 at 1037.

89

/d.at 1039.
190Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988), affid in part and rev 'd in part,
893 F.2d 541 (3" Cir. 1990)
191Jacobson, supra note 175 at 1052.
192Wetheimer, supra note 186 at 420-21.
193 id.
194id
'95Weiser, supranote 173 at W15.
1
%Id.
197See generally,LaFrance, supra note 170 at 192.
198Id. Industry misconduct issues included the industry's knowledge of and research on the addictive
properties of nicotine, suppression of health information, and evidence of marketing its products to
minors.
'
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The chain of events would trigger the settlement talks began with a
class action suit filed in federal court on behalf of "all nicotine dependent
persons" in the United States. 199 Following the arguments advanced by the class
action suit, state attorneys general began to file lawsuits against the tobacco
companies, seeking to recover state Medicaid funds spent on health care for
people suffering from injuries caused by cigarettes. 200 Approximately, one year
after the first lawsuit was filed, the tobacco companies announced that a
settlement had been reached with the state attorneys general, trial lawyers, and
health advocates. 20 '
Class Action Tort Claims
A new theory, class action tort claims, was tested in Castano v.
American Tobacco Co. 20 2 Nicotine addiction was the main theory of the case,
and the class was framed to include smokers medically diagnosed as addicted 20as3
well as those who had been medically advised to quit but had not yet done so.
This narrower focus, coupled with developing evidence that tobacco executives
engaged in activities to conceal and misrepresent information about the
addictive nature of nicotine, aided plaintiffs. 204 The class was certified on two
critical issues: (1) whether the industry had engaged in a fraudulent course of
conduct; and (2) if so, whether punitive damages were warranted.20 5
Further, an important development occurred in de-certification, In
Matter of Rhone-Poulence Rorer.206 Hemophiliacs suffering from AIDS brought
a class action against blood manufacturers.20 7 The plaintiff based their liability
argument on the defendant's alleged failure to take reasonable care in guarding
against the known risks of hepatitis (care that would have protected
hemophiliacs from contracting AIDS), and in failing to take adequate care with
respect to donors. 20 8 The court reasoned that the claims were based on laws that
varied from state to state, creating potentially significant difficulties in trying the
cases in consolidated fashion. 20 9 Further, certification was unfair to the industry,

Weiser, at WI5. The class action lawsuit was later decertified and thrown out of federal court.
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 734 (5" Cir. 1996). The suit was refilled in more
than a dozen state courts. Weiser at WI5. At least one of the suits has been dismissed by a federal
court. See also John Swartz & Saundra Torry, Assault on Tobacco Slows as PennsylvaniaCase Is
Dismissed, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1997, at A03.
20 Weiser, supra note 173 at W15. Mississippi was the first state to file a lawsuit against tobacco
companies, filing on May 23, 1996. Thirty-nine other states followed Mississippi's example. See
also Mark Curriden, Tobacco Seeks Talks Before Trial, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Oct. 11, 1997, at IA.
201Paul Raebum, Smoke and Mirrors?, BUS. WK., Sept. 8, 1997, at 83.
202 Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev d, 84 F.3d 734 (5"1Cir
1996).
'o' Robert Rabin, Symposium Article, The Tobacco Litigation:A Tentative Assessment, 51 DEPAUL
L. REV. 331, 333 (2001).
199

04Id.

20

5 Id at 333-334.

206
207 In

Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d 1293 (7' Cir. 1995).

Id.

205Rabin,
29Id.

supranote 204 at 334.
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which had in fact won twelve of the thirteen individual trials that had taken
place. 210 This requirement would be premature because further individual trials
might indicate that mass certification was unnecessary.2 '
These arguments appeared in the Castano appeal and were cited and
quoted throughout the opinion.21 2 The court also noted a considerable number of
problems that would be raised by consolidation, including: determinations of
reliance, comparative fault, consumer expectations, and actual damages, which
would need be addressed at some state, even if they could be disregarded at the
initial phase of trial.21 3
After Castano, many similar cases were either dismissed or remained in
state courts, contradicting the notion that choice of law was the essence of the
tobacco consolidation concern. 214 As of mid-2001, class certification of postCastano cases had been granted and upheld only in the
215 state of Louisiana, but
denied or remained in doubt in twenty-five other states.
Another case developed during this time, was Engle v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. 2 16 This Florida state court class action was filed independently of
Castano, but asserted the traditional disease-related basis for claiming injury
instead of an addiction-based theory.217 In 1996, a Florida intermediate court of
appeals upheld the certification of a class of some 300,000-700,000 Florida
smokers suffering from tobacco-related diseases. 218 The case was deemed
certified to determine whether the industry had engaged in deceptive conduct;
whether the epidemiological evidence established a causal link between
smoking and a variety of diseases from which members of the class suffered;
and whether punitive damages were warranted. 2 19 After the jury answered each
of these questions affirmatively, they found that the three class representative
plaintiffs were entitled to $12.7 million in compensatory damages, and in mid2000, it found that punitive damages for the entire class were warranted in the
sum of $144.8 billion.220 Subsequently, the trial court judge upheld the award,
and the industry appealed.22'
Whether the plaintiffs' victory in the Engle case will survive is highly
uncertain. 222 Massive punitive damage awards are routinely cut back on
2 10

Id.

211Id.

212Id. See also, Susan Kearns, Note, Decertificationof Statewide Tobacco ClassActions, 74 N.Y.U.

L. REV. 1336 (1999).
213Rabin, supra note 204 at 334-35.
214Id. at 335.

215Bob Van Voris, What's Tobacco'sFuture in the Bush Era? NAT'L L.J., Feb. 5, 2001, at Al.
216
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. FLA 2000), reh 'g denied,
motion granted.
217Myron Levin, PassiveAggressor; Litigation:Lawyer Stanley M. Rosenblat's Small Firm May
Seem an Unlikely Adversaryfor Big Tobacco, But He's Confident He's Up to the Challenge of His
Life, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1997, at Dl.
218R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So.2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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appeal.223 Further, the prospect of thousands of trials, or in the alternative, the
monumental task of subclassing cases for efficient disposition in a fashion
consistent with due process, could lead the appellate courts to overturn the Engle
case altogether.224
The State Health CareReimbursement Cases
The health care reimbursement claim, which was first used in a
Mississippi case, was soon used in many different states, although it rested on a
very different premise than Castano.225 The state's theory of recovery was not
based on products liability law because the state was not a "direct" victim
suffering from a tobacco related disease.226 Instead, the argument was based on a
theory for relief on equitable grounds such as unjust enrichment. 227
In essence, the states' legal theories, which later came to include
statutorily based claims, such as violation of consumer protection laws, asserted
that the industry's deceptive and misleading conduct constituted a wrong against
the public, as well as against individual smokers.228 In arguing unjust
enrichment, the claim was for restitution of public tax funds that were allocated
to treating indigent smokers whose health problems were allegedly the
industry's responsibility.229 Under a similar theory of wrongfully profiting at the
expense of the public through claims of conspiracy and consumer fraud, some
cases went after the industry for making smoking attractive to underage
youths.230
The theories of recovery multiplied to include deceptive advertising,
antitrust violations, federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
claims, unfair competition, a variety of fraud allegations, and in at least two
states, Florida and Massachusetts, statutory claims based on the enactment of
specific health care cost recovery legislation. 23' The number of states bringing
suit also multiplied, and by the summer of 1997, the number was 40.232
In June 1997, after months of rumors, the states and the major tobacco
companies reached a "global settlement" - which was actually a detailed
legislative proposal that was presented to Congress as an effort to end the
tobacco wars.233 The tobacco industry was now prepared to underwrite the
223id.
224id.
5

22 Id. at 337.
226Id.

227
Id.
228
id.
229id.
230id.

21 See generally,Bryce A Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to Healthcareand Beyond- A Critiqueof
Lawsuits Targeting UnpopularIndustries, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1334, 1346, 1358-61(2001)
(explaining the allegations of deceit and fraud against tobacco companies and the basis for RICO
claims); Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1727, 1733 (2001) (referring to antitrust
suits against the tobacco industry).
232Doug Levy, Tobacco Turns Over New Leaf Critics Say ProposedDeal Leave Bad Taste in
Mouth, USA TODAY, June 23, 1997, at lB.

233Rabin, supranote 204 at 338.
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largest civil settlement ever by paying $368.5 billion over twenty-five years to
reach closure.234
The June 1997 agreement demonstrated the threat that these new
litigation strategies posed to the tobacco industry.235 Under this plan, the state
health care reimbursement suits would have been settled, and the industry would
have been granted immunity from all other forms of class action.236 The industry
would therefore eliminate its greatest nightmare - the fear of catastrophic loss
from the states themselves, certified classes of tort claimants, or third party
sources, such as Blue Cross or union health plans - successfully convincing
juries that the industry's past conduct warranted potential multibillion dollar
recoveries in compensatory and punitive damages for the injury victims
represented in the particular cases.23 Another provision would have capped the
total annual liability for awards on future individual claims at five billion
dollars.238
By mid-1997, the industry faced the possibility of being sued by
virtually every state in the country, represented on a retainer basis by the most
experienced and skilled tobacco lawyers, pressing a variety of common law and
statutory claims. 239 Other third party claims also posed a potential threat as well
as the documents that told a story of industry deceit and indifference to public
health considerations.240
The negotiating parties did not realize that the "settlement" would take
on a life of its own once it reached Congress.2 4' The McCain Bill,242 as
amended, would have obligated the industry to pay $516 billion over twentyfive years, and the bill incorporated virtually all of the earlier-negotiated public
health provisions.243 The bill would also eliminate the litigation immunity
provisions negotiated earlier.2 44 However, a quick reversal occurred, and no
federal legislation was enacted, most likely because of the tobacco industry's
advertising campaign as well as the backing of congressional supporters.245
Milo Geylin, The Settlement: Terms of the Tobacco Pact, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at B10.
The proposed legislative package would also bind the industry to an array of public health proposals,
including the acknowledgement of FDA jurisdiction to engage in regulation of nicotine; agreement
to a "look back" provision under which would have subjected the industry to fines due to failure to
reduce underage smoking according to a targeted goal and timelines; and bans on billboard
advertising, use of human and cartoon figures in ads, and brand-name sponsorship of sporting events
as well as promotional merchandise.
234
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236Id. at 339.
237Id.
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Excerptsfrom Agreement between States and Tobacco Industry, N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 1997, at
B8.
239id.
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The industry began to settle individually with the four states that were
closest to trial (Mississippi, Florida, Texas and Minnesota) and that, with the
exception of Texas, presented the greatest threat of a litigation setback.246
Without such settlements, it would be possible to conclude that the third wave
strategy proved little beyond massive additional documentation of industry
wrongdoing.247
The four individual state settlements did amount to some forty billion
dollars to be paid out over twenty-five years, and within a year in November
1998, the industry and the remaining forty-six states had negotiated a $206
billion settlement of all outstanding state health care reimbursement claims,
considerably less than the proposed June 1997 settlement.248 However, this new
agreement did not contain any of the immunity provisions from class action
litigation and punitive damages included in the earlier package.249
Further, the third party claims of insurers and union health funds have
been unsuccessful with courts, and are often dismissed on remoteness
grounds.25 ° Similarly, a federal action seeking reimbursement for Medicare and
25 1
related federal health expenditures was dismissed, apart from a RICO claim.
Therefore, the industry has arguably ended any real concerns about catastrophic
liability to third party claimants at a cost that is unlikely to have a substantial
impact on its revenue.252
Environmental Tobacco Smoke Claims
The earliest tobacco class action was filed on behalf of nonsmoking
flight attendants alleging second hand smoke injuries in 1991.253 The flight
attendants claimed to be suffering from tobacco related diseases from harm in
the workplace - the airline cabins where they were regularly exposed to
tobacco-using passengers prior to the 1990 ban on in flight smoking. 2m
However, the case had very little chance of succeeding.255 It was filed
before Castano, and at a time when second hand smoke harm had not yet
attracted the attention that it would after publication of the 1992 Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) report, indicating that environmental tobacco smoke
as a known human lung carcinogen with no established safe level of exposure.256
246
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billionfor California,S.F. EXAM. Nov. 20, 1998, at A-1.
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Barry Meier, CigaretteMakers and States Draft a $206 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1998,

at Al.
249Id.

msScott Ritter, Unions' Claims on Tobacco Firmsare Rejected by Appeals Court; WALL ST. J., May
23, 2001, at B13.
251Marc Kaufman & Dan Eggen, U.S. to Seek Settlement in Tobacco Suit; Anti-Smoking Activists
Accuse Justice Depart.of Capitulation,WASH. POST, June 20, 2001, at Al.
2-2 Rabin, supra note 204 at 342.
25 Broin v. Philip Morris Cos, 641 So.2d 888 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (settlement
Oct. 10, 1997).
2 Id
255Milo Geyelin, FlightAttendants Tobacco TrialNears,WALL ST. J., June 2, 1997, at B7.
2- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Lung
Cancer and Other Disorders (1992).
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The case did have some major points in its favor, most importantly, a
sympathetic plaintiff class (flight attendants) that could not be subjected to an
assumption of the risk defense. 257 Virtually everyone was familiar with the
smoking section of an airplane and could identify with the exposure of the flight
attendants.258 On the other hand, even after the publication of the EPA report,
the data on workplace exposure remained thin; the strongest association between
secondhand smoke and pulmonary disease was household exposure, especially
of young children. 9
The main issue in the case became the nationwide class certification.
The court of appeals stated that generic causation and industry course of conduct
were questions common to the class, as well as an assessment of the
egregiousness of defendant's conduct. 260 Further, any choice of law problems
and individual issues of damages could be decided at a later stage.26'
However, during the trial, a $349 million settlement was announced,
before these issues could be addressed.262 The tobacco industry had once again
demonstrated its vulnerability, just as it did in the settlements of the four state
health care reimbursement cases in Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and
Minnesota.263
IndividualClaims Revitalized
In Carter v. Brown & Williamson,264 it was held the industry's
responsibility exceeded that of the plaintiff, however, it was not argued that the
plaintiff was not at fault.265 Further, no claim for punitive damages was made,
despite the introduction of evidence of the tobacco company's efforts to conceal
health-related information.266 The jury entered a verdict of $750,000 in
compensatory damages for the plaintiff s lung cancer.267
However, within two years, in Widdick v. Brown & Williamson,268 the
jury held that the industry was not responsible for the health effects of the
plaintiffs' smoking in another pair of Florida cases. 269 Between March and May
1999, juries awarded verdicts of $50 million in punitive damages in the
257Rabin, supra note 204 at 342.
25

Id.

259EPA report at 7-10 to 7-21.
2

Rabin, supra note 204 at 342.

261
id.

Settlement of Second-Hand-Smoke Suit of Flight Attendants Approved by Judge, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 9, 1998, at B7.
263Rabin, supra note 204 at 343.
26 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 680 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), rev 'd,
Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 723 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), reh 'g
granted, Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 732 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1999), quashed,778
So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 533 U.S. 950
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California case of Henley v. Philip MorrisInc.,270 and $85 million in the Oregon
case of Williams-Branch v. Philip Morris, Inc. 271 By mid-2000, another
multimillion dollar California jury award had been registered, but also defense
verdicts before juries in Mississippi and New York; and all of the five verdicts
for the plaintiffs remained on appeal except for Carter, in which the plaintiff's
award was finally upheld.272 A California jury also handed down a three billion
dollar punitive damage award in mid-2001.273
The importance of the tobacco documents has become readily apparent.
By the late 1990s, a tobacco litigator could build a case against the industry on
the voluminous document discovery in the state health care cost recovery
suits
274
and the class action litigation, as well as the whistleblower revelations.
Even though massive liability awards now seem possible, the industry
still had strong arguments. Relying on the individualistic nature of American
culture, freedom of choice remains a powerful defense. 275 This is especially true
as the industry confesses to its past actions and argues it has now reformed its
ways under new "enlightened leadership. 276 This freedom of choice defense
will be very successful if the documents become only a matter of historical
interest, and if the industry concedes that addiction means it is very hard but
nonetheless possible to quit - and this plaintiff, unlike so many other exsmokers knowledgeable of the health risks, did not demonstrate the requisite
power.277
From the beginning, the industry has argued the causal link between
smoking and allegedly tobacco-related diseases has never been conclusively
established: correlation is not causation. 278 However this is proved to the
contrary by the voluminous findings as well as the hypocrisy revealed in the
industry documents. 279 However this does not rule out the argument that this
particular plaintiff has a type of lung cancer not associated strongly with
smoking, died from an independent disease, or died from lung cancer but was
massively exposed to asbestos.280 Many of these claims may arise in connection
with the FCTC.
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ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCTC
Currently, the WHO has no judicial body of its own.28 ' In the event that
the FCTC causes a debate about its provisions that negotiation between the
282
parties cannot solve, they may bring their dispute to an international court.
The WHO Constitution provides that disputes about the interpretation of the
WHO Constitution not settled by negotiation or by the WHA will be referred to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) unless the parties agree otherwise.2 3
The ICJ is the classic international court and the United Nations'
principal judicial organ. 28" The most significant restriction on cases before the
ICJ is that the parties must be states. 285 Advisory opinions may be authorized at
the request of any286body authorized by the UN Charter to make such a request,
such as the WHO.
Conflicts that arise dealing with international trade issues may also be
brought before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) Panels and Appellate
Body (AB).287 Like the ICJ, the WTO courts only decide cases where the parties
are states. 288 However, unlike the ICJ, WTO judgments can be enforced through
trade sanctions if the other party fails to comply. 289 Dispute before the WTO
bodies originate from a violation of a trade agreement, usually GATT.29 °
The WHO may also create its own judiciary body291, which would be
consistent with the WHA's authority under Article 18(1) of the WHO
Constitution, stating that a function of the WHA is to "establish such other
institutions as it may consider desirable. 292 Further, the WHO recently
proposed a new body, the Committee of Arbitration, to interpret the
International Health Resolutions.293 Therefore, the WHO may develop its own
dispute settlement body based on the theory that problems may arise in
connection with the FCTC and the WHO would have more expertise294and be
more efficient and consistent than the ICJ in deciding technical matters.
281
See generally WHO Const. Arts. 9-37.
282
Woo, supranote 8 at 1746.
283
WHO Const. Art. 75
284
Woo, supra 8 at 1746, see also Lori F Damrosch,. et al., InternationalLaw: Cases and Materials,
820 (4 h ed. 2001); Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993.
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CONCLUSION
The WHO is attempting to develop a Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, with the intention of combating the tobacco epidemic. This is
the first time in history the WHO has proposed to create the world's first set of
multilateral negotiated rules devoted entirely to a public health issue under its
rulemaking authority. While the FCTC will not be ready for signature until
sometime during 2003, suggested Protocols may include such specific
obligations
as:
pricing,
smuggling,
tax-free
tobacco
products,
advertising/sponsorships, internet advertising/trade, testing methods, package
design/labeling, information sharing, and agricultural diversification.
Any agreement proposed by the WHO will have implications on the
free trade of tobacco. States often object to international agreements such as the
FCTC upon the basis of state sovereignty rights. Further, there may be great
economic implications for developed as well as developing nations of such an
agreement. The United States especially has a great interest in the development
of the FCTC since it is the world's largest exporter of tobacco.
In the United States public attitude towards smoking has been shifting,
and many lawsuits have arisen in this area. These lawsuits may provide
information in the development of potential claims that may arise throughout the
world in connection with the FCTC.
Due to the lack of judicial body of the FCTC, potential injured parties
may be without a venue to raise their claim. The WHO may use the ICJ, the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body and Appellate Body or may even need to
develop their own judicial body in order to create a venue for the FCTC. The
WHO has to keep in mind all these interests if they want the FCTC to survive,
and this will require both time and effort on the part of the Organization, as well
as on the part of the nations of the world.
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